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September 24, 1974 
ORTOLI CALLS FOR RAPID JOINT ECONOMIC ACTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
Following is an address by EC Commission President Francois-Xavier 
Ortoli before the Twelfth Congress of the Association of European 
Journalists, September 13 in Mainz, Germany. 
It is a well known fact there is a Providence for journalists. This Congress 
is meeting at a time when, despite considerable inertia and heart-searching, a new 
desire to "get Europe moving" seems to be emerging. There is reason to 
believe that the next few weeks will provide an answer to the great question: 
is Europe going to continue to stagnate or is it going to get off the ground 
again? MOreover this immediately raises a second question: if Europe gets 
moving again, on what basis will it do this, and how fast will it go? In 
other words, if it gets under way again will this new progress be accompanied 
by innovation, by change in its methods, its responsibilitie~ and its institutions? 
Let us not be unfair: Europe has recently begun to advance again. This is 
clear from its Mediterranean policy, its development and association policies, and 
the slow but sure resumption of economic and monetary cooperation. 
' 
None of these achievements should be underestimated. 
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Economic and monetary union, based primarily on progressive alignment of 
currencies, had not only fallen back in recent years; but even the very concept had 
lost ground. Under the hammer blows of inflation and of international monetary 
disorder, the doctrine underlying all that has been done since 1970 was shattered 
and nothing was found to replace it. As a result, and despite all our warnings, 
the Community marked time for months, although this must be contrasted with the 
actions undertaken since June -- too slowly but nevertheless surely to my mind --
on the initiative of the Commission. 
Three positive points can be made in this connection. 
Firstly, the Ministers of Economic and Financial Affairs have adopted the 
principle of holding monthly meetings. There is nothing spectacular about this, 
and a procedural decision of this nature does not have any great impact on 
public opinion, but one thing is certain: if joint action is to be taken in 
economic matters, there must be a real forum for consultation and decision-making 
and, even more important, policies and personalities must be in close harmony. This 
vital condition can now be met. 
Secondly, an action program is being worked out on the basis of the 
proposals we have put forward in recent months, particularly on June 5. This 
is a minimum program, centered on the possibility of a Community loan. However, at 
least we have primed the pump again and the Commission, which has been responsible for 
this timid initial step, will do all it can to ensure that future progress will 
go further and faster. 
Thirdly, it is very important for us to give serious consideration to setting 
up technical and financial machinery for the implementation of genuine Community 
solidarity. Hitherto, there had been no understanding of the fact that solidarity 
was both a major political act and an absolute economic necessity. All the 
speeches made about interdependence had no firm content. In the next few weeks, this 
content should begin to emerge; this is a political fact of really major significance. 
, 
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There has been yet another important step forward: Europe is setting 
up a policy of development aid. There are more and more indications of 
this: the progress in the Kingston talks with the 44 African, Caribbean, 
and Pacifi~ countries, the possibility of setting up machinery to stabilize 
export earnings in the Association setting, Community initiative on the 
emergency fund to assist the poorest countries, extension of food aid measures, 
special action in the Sahel, etc. 
More than anywhere else it is here that Europe's external vocation is 
being affirmed and the elaboration of a common development policy today strikes 
me as being a keystone. Here we encounter none of the obstacles which the 
absence of genuine political union puts in the way of integrating foreign policies 
nor those arising from the links between foreign policy and defense policy. 
On the contrary, it is possible, without specific interests separating the 
member states, to work together, using economic means and not just diplomacy, 
to help solve the problems which in my view, along with the reestablishrnent of 
economic equilibrium and the establishment of security, are the most important 
and the most urgent facing the international community. 
I cannot therefore stress this point too much. Apart from the economic 
field, development policy is today a high-priority area of the joint activities 
undertaken by our member states in external relations. I hope that this new impulse 
will take on a concrete form and that in this field the Nine will develop both a 
doctrinal basis and the common machinery for action which will multiply the results 
achieved and enable Europe as such to pull its full weight in rescuing the Third World. 
So let us not be unfair. But at the same time let us not be blind to 
reality. It is striking to see how, in the last few months, no decisive step, 
indeed no step of any importance whatsoever, has been taken to strengthen the 
Community from within. There lies the truth, and Europe is a prey to doubt. 
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One response to this situation is to give up the struggle and to let the 
European venture stagnate, and eventually die. There is no need to take any 
decisions for this. If we just let matters continue as they are going at present we 
will achieve it sooner or later and in any case we will kill off any faith in 
Europe which still remains, and at the same time all creative capacity and 
dynamism. It would take very little to change the Council of Ministers into a 
Committee of Ministers, the Commission into a secretariat, the Parliament into 
a body of technical advisers and the Common Market into a free trade area. 
The Commission rejects this hypothesis. No_such evolution will happen. Most 
Europeans and most European politicians do not want it to happen, as can be seen 
from the initiatives being taken. It it does happe~it will be through weakness and 
not by design. Indeed, there is the will to stop it happening, and this must 
be strengthened and given practical form. 
This was the starting point for the debate which began a few months ago, in 
a state of confusion, between those in favor of digging in and consolidating past 
achievements and those in favor of fleeing forward on the principle that attack 
is the best means of defense. As is often the case, neither of these two attitudes 
alone really responds to the needs of the present situation. 
Consolidation of what the Community has already achieved is the least we can aim 
for. However --and this is the essential point -- to do this it is not enough to 
adopt a purely conservative stance, and I do not accept the idea of a temporary 
standstill. The customs union may collapse if certain member states rely solely 
on protectionist measures in order to stave off catastrophe. It may collapse if the 
international economic and monetary situation deteriorates seriously. Here the 
interests of Europe tally with those of its member states and of the international 
economy. Everything therefore demands the establishment of reliable and durable 
machinery at two levels: the international level, where added strength must be given 
both to existing institutions and to more flexible forms of cooperation, and the 
European level. 
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Obviously we must go further on the European level than on any other in 
view, not only of the aims we fixed for ourselves when we decided to create 
Europe, but also of the identity which we wish to achieve for ourselves, and of 
the economic interdependence which has been created both by law (the Common Market) 
and by circumstances (our geographical and economic unity) and of the specific 
interests which we have in common. Furthermore, our energy and commodity requirements 
mean that an orderly development of international trade is vital for us. 
Thus, there is not conflict in the monetary and economic field between our 
action at the European level and our international action. 
Both of these are necessary, and not only the progress of Europe but also 
our very way of life depends on them. Quite simply, we must clarify in this 
connection our objectives and the means at our disposal. As I see it: 
(a) International economic and monetary cooperation, in particular 
with the United States and Japan, must be organized on a systematic 
basis, but -- and this point is of capital importance -- Europe, alone 
or in conjunction with the member states, must progressively be 
represented as an entity. 
(b) Instruments and machinery of a Community nature, that is which are 
managed by the Community institutions, or, if operating at national 
level, identical and established by joint decision, must also be created 
progressively. Consultations or exchanges of view, of which moreover 
I am in favor, are not sufficient in themselves since they do not measure 
up to our Community interests or to the profit we must derive from our 
unity. In spite of the differences of development and position, Europe 
is indeed a whole with its own peculiar general characteristics, 
continuing problems which are the same, interests of its own, and it 
must act as a whole. A great number of actions are possible -- from the 
strengthening of the European monetary cooperation fund, to the harmonization 
of banking rules via the creation of European machinery to help the recycling 
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of capital (the system of Community loans which we have proposed is an example 
of this) or the establishment of a European "Eximbank." 
(c) Solidarity within Europe must become a reality. I deeply regret 
that this solidarity is not being manifested loudly and strongly on 
the occasion of the energy crisis. 
We have proposed that this solidarity should be organized with practical 
means to face up to the economic and monetary problems we are encountering. 
Its political value is irrefutable. Its economic advantages, for all of us, 
and not only for the direct beneficiaries, is equally evident. It is therefore 
possible to prevent serious economic situations obliging a State, in the absence 
of sufficient support, to resort to protectionism. This is an incentive for the 
development of courageous policies, because solidarity presupposes serious and 
convincing efforts to redress a situation, and therefore constitutes an essential 
component of the machinery in the combat against inflation and recession, which 
must be the major immediate objective of our member states and of the Community. 
The launching of a common energy policy and the establishment of a regional 
policy seem to me to be complementary to joint action in the economic and monetary 
fields. 
The energy deficit, and its consequences on the balance of payments, will 
be the major obstacle weighing on the economic development of Europe and the 
world in general over the next few years. I have continually said, and will 
say again, that this obstacle will not be, if not removed, at least lightened, 
without a courageous and lasting policy. For reasons of economic efficacity, and 
to ensure for the best-- using Europe's combined weight -- the defense of our 
interests in the international debate, we must, in the coming months, define a 
European energy policy. The Commission has proposed the guidelines of such a policy. 
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Regional policy is one of the keys of the alignment of our economies. 
We mu5t not harbor any illusions. For technical and political reasons, it is 
impractical in the medium term to hope to achieve economic and monetary union, or 
indeed European union itself, between partners with excessively divergent levels of 
development. For technical reasons, as we can clearly see, because different 
situations lead to different policies, and this is not merely a matter of short-
term economic policy. For political reasons, because, among the promises for the 
future which Europe offers us, we see those of relative equality of well-being 
and because no deep and close unity will be achieved unless the states of Europe, 
and the citizens of Europe, feel themselves to be fully part of a sufficiently 
balanced whole. These are the essential points of a regional policy, a policy 
which in recent discussions we have too often considered from the narrowest angle, 
that is the financial aspect. 
I must be very definite here: as I see it, in the state of inertia and frustration 
in which Europe at present finds itself, consolidation and progress go hand in 
hand. The two are linked at the political, but also at the technical level. 
Up to now, it may seem that I have left to one side the political aspect 
of the problems. This is, however, of paramount importance. 
I will tackle it from a general angle without elaborating on the questions 
raised by the requests for "renegotiation" presented by the British Govenunent --
questions to which I attach importance you can imagine, starting from my previous 
reflections on the actions to be undertaken, actions which I have mentioned by 
way of example, and not as a program. 
First and foremost, to have meaning and scope the relaunching of Europe, 
at whatever level, and particularly at the political level, will have to be 
accompanied by concrete decisions, by action "on the ground" concerning the main 
problem of the moment for us all, in other words, an effective reaction to the 
economic and monetary problems facing us. 
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Finally, cooperation between states does have its usefulness, but it must 
under no circwnstances hecome the only means, or even the privileged means, of 
advancing the construction of Europe. I urge everyone to remember this: the construction of 
Europe has achieved lasting success in only those areas in which there are common 
policies: the customs union, the commercial policy, and also, in spite of present 
difficulties, the common agricultural policy. 
Our institutional machinery enables us to operate a common market and exercise 
powers proper to Europe. I attribute many of our failures to an exaggerated 
insistence on intergovernmental solutions where logic and efficiency would demand 
common instruments. This is a fundamental point in analysis and reflection for 
the future. I hope it will be considered impassionately without any unwarranted 
assumption that certain premises are true or implicit taking for granted of what 
has to be proved on the part both by those who fear any transfer of power and 
by those who would like such transfers to be very extensive. 
This leads me to the institutions or, to be more accurate to the Executive. 
Questions are asked about the Executive of the Community, in particular the 
Commission. It is criticized at times. 
Before going into greater detail I wish to say three things, which must be 
said and said clearly. 
A Community of nine member states, three of which have recently joined, 
which works in six languages, on many difficult matters with one Council meeting 
on foreign affairs per month, is necessarily cumbersome even exceptionally so. Of 
course, a certain amount of progress can always be made in this field. This is 
also the case in the member states, which are not laboring under the same constraints. 
However, definitive progress would be possible only by means of a much more extensive 
delegation of responsibilities and decision-making power. This is what I hope for, 
but we have not yet come that far. We must therefore accept the consequences of a 
certain situation in Europe which affects structures. 
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I am not talking here as an advocate defending any cause with any old arguments. 
As director general for the internal market in the Connnission 15 years ago, I proposed 
loudly and clearly that the most lightly built administration possible should be 
set up. As President, I have refused the creation of any posts for the coming year, 
even secretarial ones except those for absolutely essential technical connnitments, 
for example the language service. 
Moreover, if Europe is to grow,the necessary power and resources must be 
transferred to it. When the Connnission proposes new projects and requests a 
larger budget it is fully exercising its European responsibility. If it is decided 
to extend the research policy at European level,money is needed. This must 
be estimated as accurately as possible, but it is nonetheless essential. If the 
Yaounde Association is extended,money will be needed. If a regional fund is 
created money, will be needed. Let us therefore have no recriminations and counter-
recriminations over imaginary issues. There can be no policy without the necessary 
resources to apply it. 
Finally, I must recall that the little which has been done over the last few 
months has been done essentially at the initiative or by a decision of the Connnission. 
This even includes the improvement of Council procedures which we proposed together 
with President CWalter) Scheel, the progress, even as regards procedure, in the 
economic and monetary field, and the revision of the Italian agricultural measures after 
the Council had been unable to reach any solution. 
And if the Connnission's proposal had been adopted -- even after amending it --
how many important decisions could have been taken. 
However, the question of the responsibility of the institutions in the Community's 
difficulties should not be examined from the narrow point of view of the degree of 
efficiency of the Connnission and the Council and the cumbersomeness or inertia of 
one or other of these bodies. 
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In reality we have been stumbling over the same obstacles for a number of 
years, and more resoundingly in the periods of difficulty: 
(a) The ever more marked refusal to embark on common policies and transfer 
powers, with the result that everything is handled by ad hoc decisions taken one 
by one outside any rigorous framework and under the influence of circumstances 
or moods without the constraint of any clear authority, which must be exercised 
whether we like it or not; 
(b) the blocking of the decision-making machinery, since the principle 
of unanimity, even if it is not invoked, in fact governs all Community action, 
even down to the smallest details; 
(c) finally, a certain amount of disagreement on the objectives to be 
pursued, which, in spite of the decisions of principle taken at the Summit 
conferences has helped to prevent any development of new large-sca.le actions. 
From ·che institutional point of view, basic questions therefore arise, the 
solution of which calls for a serious discussion which I hope will finally be 
initiated in one way or another. 
In this connection the desire to strengthen the powers of the Council of 
~tinisters over those of the Commission would not only be contrary to the balance 
established by the Treaty of Rome but also impracticable and even dangerous. 
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In the first place, which of the Commission's powers could be transferred 
to the Council? The power to make proposals? This privilege to "make proposals" 
within the meaning of the Treaty of Rome is not the power of initiative. Neither the 
treaty nor Community practice have deprived the member states of the power of 
initiative, political initiative and also the power to amend Commission proposals. 
The power of deci~ion? It is the Council which holds this or at least the Commission 
has it only on rare occasions. When it does have it, I believe it exercises it 
quite well. One example is the recent case involving the exceptional Italian 
measures: the only results here were achieved by the Commission making use, after 
excellent work with the Italian Government, of the power of decision which fell to 
it as the Council had not been able to decide. The power of administration? 
is not what is being discussed. A Council of Ministers cannot administrate. 
case I do not believe that anyone contests this. 
This 
In any 
Finally, let us not forget one of the tasks of the Commission, which is at the 
heart of our political and institutional set up. The Commission and the responsibilities 
conferred upon it by the Treaty provide a guarantee against the imbalances which 
could one day arise as a result of the varying importance of our member states and 
special affinities which could grow up among them. In a consideration of Europe 
this factor must never be lsot sight of. 
Finally, as far as the Council itself is concerned, I would say quite briefly 
that the shortcomings in its functioning are no secret for anyone even it it has 
recently adopted certain measures to improve matters. 
A new balance between the institutions is not the answer. All the institutions 
nrust be strengthened, all the institutions must be made to fill1ction normally and 
healthily once more, and the adjustments dictated by experience must be made. 
- 12 -
~ Political recognition that the Community is the pivot of the development 
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of Europe, a return to effective decision-making procedures, acceptance of delegation 
of responsibility where this is necessary to attain the desired objective, all of 
these are essential to a happier Europe. 
Experience has shown us that our institutions can be complemented in two ways. 
Firstly, the role of the European Parliament can be strengthened, and I would say 
here that the decision to strengthen its budgetary powers is only a first step in this 
direction. Secondly, our leaders can provide an impetus which, when it comes to 
important political decisions, cannot be provided by the routine, if active, 
functioning of our institutions. I am therefore very pleased indeed that our 
heads of state or of government are taking a personal interest in Europe. A place 
must be found for this interest, both in spirit and in practice, within our 
institutional system if we are to avoid the danger I mentioned earlier. We must 
be vigilfu1t, we must guard against any distortion of our system but we must also 
welcome high-level political activity which is in the interests of Europe. 
Make no mistake about the implications of these remarks. They are not intended to 
be conservative. The move towards European union and the realization of European 
nion will mean a drastic change in the role of the institutions: Parliament, Council, 
Corrnnission. The transformation must be well thought out. It must be part of an 
overall plan for decisive progress. It must be a factor in the far-reaching ambitious 
change in the blueprint for Europe. We must prepare our plans carefully. It is 
good that Europe's leading politicians feel that the future of Europe must be discussed; 
and I trust that they will make rapid progress. My own ideas on the subject can wait. 
But it seems to me that the prospect of such a change, which may materialize sooner 
than would have been thought possible up to quite recently, is already conclusive. Let 
us hope that the men determined to build Europe, the men who are now the leaders of 
our states, the Commission, indeed every responsible European will, in the months 
ahead, help to give greater force to the Community in its present form and to 
prepare for the ultimate objective, the future of a truly united Europe. 
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